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1It is an enormous honor to accept this honorary doctorate from the 
Institute of Social Studies.  I have for some time had enormous 
admiration for the public culture of philosophy in The Netherlands, 
and this wonderful Institute provides a good deal of the impetus for 
reflections about social justice and human flourishing that take place 
in this country.  I thank you most humbly and sincerely.  Because 
my argument will connect democratic education closely to emotional 
and imaginative cultivation, let me begin my talk with an example 
from ancient Athenian tragedy, the ending of Euripides' The Trojan 
Women.   
The towers of Troy are burning.   All that is left of the once-proud 
city is a group of ragged women, bound for slavery, their husbands 
dead in battle, their sons murdered by the conquering Greeks, their 
daughters raped.  Hecuba their queen invokes the king of the gods, 
using, remarkably, the language of democratic citizenship: "Son of 
Kronus,  Council-President of Troy, father who gave us birth, do you 
see these undeserved sufferings that your Trojan people bear?"  The 
Chorus answers grimly, "He sees, and yet the great city is no city. It 
has perished, and Troy exists no longer."   A little later, Hecuba herself 
concludes that the gods are not worth calling on, and that the very 
name of her land has been wiped out.
In one way, the ending of this drama is as bleak as any in the history 
of tragic drama.  Death, rape, slavery, fire destroying the towers, the 
city's very name effaced from the record of history by the acts of rapa-
cious and murderous Greeks.   And yet, of course, it did not happen 
that way, not exactly.  For the story of Troy's fall is being enacted, 
some six hundred years after the event, by a company of Greek 
actors, in the Greek language of a Greek poet, in the presence of all 
the adult citizens of Athens, most powerful of Greek cities.  Hecuba's 
cry to the gods even imagines him as a peculiarly Athenian type of 
civic official, president of the city council.   So the name of the land 
didn't get wiped out after all.  The imaginations of the conquerors 
were haunted by it, transmitted it, and mourn it.  Obsessively their 
arts repeat the events of long-ago destruction, typically inviting, as 
here, the audience's compassion for the women of Troy and blame 
for their assailants.   In its very structure the play makes a claim for 
the moral value of compassionate imagining, as it asks its audience to 
partake in the terror of a burning city, of murder and rape and slavery. 
Insofar as members of the audience are engaged by this drama, feel-
ing fear and grief for the conquered city, they demonstrate the ability 
of compassion to cross lines of time, place, and nation - and also, in 
the case of many audience members, the line of sex, perhaps more 
difficult yet to cross.  
Nor was the play an aesthetic event cut off from political reality.  The 
dramatic festivals of Athens were sacred festivals strongly connected 
to the idea of democratic deliberation, and the plays of Euripides were 
particularly well known for their engagement with contemporary 
events.  In this case, the audience that watched The Trojan Women 
had recently voted to put to death the men of the rebellious colony of 
Melos and to enslave the women and children.  Euripides invites them 
to contemplate the real human meaning of their actions.  Compassion 
for the women of Troy should at least cause moral unease, reminding 
Athenians of the full and equal humanity of people who live in distant 
places, their fully human capacity for suffering.
But did those imaginations really cross those lines?  Think again of 
that invocation of Zeus.  Trojans, if they worshipped Zeus as king 
of gods at all, surely did not refer to him as the president of the city 
council.  The term prytanis is an Athenian legal term, completely 
unknown elsewhere.  So it would appear that Hecuba is not a Trojan 
but a Greek.  Her imagination is a Greek democratic (and, we might 
add, mostly male) imagination.  Maybe that's a good thing, in the 
sense that the audience is surely invited to view her as their fellow 
and equal.  But it still should give us pause.   Did compassion really 
enable those Greeks to reach out and think about the real humanity 
of others, or did it stop short, allowing them to reaffirm the essen-
tial Greekness of everything that's human?   Of course compassion 
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required making the Trojans somehow familiar, so that Greeks could 
see their own vulnerability in them.  But it's so easy for the familiari-
zation to go too far: they are just us, and we are the ones who suffer 
humanly.  Not those other ones, over there in Melos.  
The democratic imagination is powerful but flawed.  As in ancient 
Athens, so too now, democratic citizens often think well together 
about common problems, even problems involving people in dis-
tant nations with whom they have dealings.   The imagination has a 
powerful capacity to imagine the sufferings and needs of people at a 
distance, and at least in principle it can usefully inform public debate 
about policy.  But the Hecuba example shows that this imagination 
also has limits.  It can be self-serving, imagining one's own nation 
as the source of all human values and dehumanizing other cultures 
in consequence.  Democratic citizens can also fail to think critically 
about what they hear, putting anger, fear,  and power ahead of reason. 
Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War shows many instances 
of this failing - not least in the debate about Mytilene, another defeat-
ed colony that, like Melos, had rebelled against Athens.  Swayed by 
the powerful but highly irrational rhetoric of politician Cleon, the 
people voted to put to death all the men of the colony and to enslave 
the women and children.  They sent a ship to execute the grim com-
mand.   Then, after hearing a well-argued and persuasive speech by 
Diodotus, they changed their mind, and sent a second ship to cancel 
the order of death.  It was only by sheer chance, because the first ship 
was stalled at sea by a windless spell, that the second ship caught the 
first and lives were spared.  So the democratic mind is also careless, 
prone to hasty and irrational thinking.
All modern democracies, like ancient Athens but even more so, are 
part of an interlocking world, a world that makes decisions not only 
about internal matters but also about the life and death of strangers. 
It is a world of staggering inequalities.  The life expectancy at birth of 
a child born in the United States is about 78 years.  In Sierra Leone, 
life expectancy at birth is about 38 years.  How can we educate demo-
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cratic citizens who think well about these inequalities, understanding 
the reality of distant lives without making the errors that Euripides 
and Thucydides so vividly depicted?   I shall now argue that the 
educational concepts of the ancient Greek philosophers, in particular 
Socrates and the Greek and Roman Stoics, give us a great deal of help 
in solving this problem.
What I am about to propose is a concept of what is often called 
"liberal education."  The very term "liberal education" derives from 
the Roman Stoic philosopher Seneca, who was also a leading politi-
cian, in an era of great anxiety and conflict.  So let me begin with his 
reflections, which are continuous, as we'll soon see, with the practice 
of Socrates, as well as the ideas of the older Greek Stoics.  In the 
letter that invents our modern concept of liberal education, Seneca 
begins by describing the usual style of Roman education, noting that 
it is called "liberal" (liberalis, "connected to freedom"), because it is 
understood to be an education for well-brought-up young gentlemen, 
who were called the liberales, the "free-born."  It was an accultura-
tion into Roman traditions, in which young people simply absorbed 
received values.  He himself, he now announces, would use the term 
"liberal" in a very different way.  In his view, an education is truly 
"liberal" only if it is one that "liberates" the student's mind, encourag-
ing him or her to take charge of his or her own thinking, leading the 
Socratic examined life and becoming a reflective critic of traditional 
practices.  (I say "him or her" not just out of contemporary political 
correctness: Stoic philosophers of the first century AD wrote at length 
about the equal education of women, and defended the radical view 
that women as much as men should lead the examined life.)  Seneca 
goes on to argue that only this sort of education will develop each 
person's capacity to be fully human, by which he means self-aware, 
self-governing, and capable of respecting the humanity of all our fel-
low human beings, no matter where they are born, no matter what 
social class they inhabit, no matter what their gender or ethnic origin. 
"Soon we shall breathe our last," he concludes in his related treatise 
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On Anger.  "Meanwhile, while we live, while we are among human 
beings, let us cultivate our humanity." 
This concept of a link between liberal education and a deeper and 
more inclusive kind of citizenship has a special urgency in our times, 
as the global market is increasingly putting pressure on all human-
istic ideas in education, as educational proposals based on technical 
ability alone are becoming increasingly popular.  When education 
is discussed in most modern democracies, the focus is on education 
for profitability in the global market, and we rarely see a focus on 
the education of the imagination and the critical faculties.  But these 
abilities are crucial to the health of democracy: so we need the ideas 
of the ancient Greeks and Romans more than ever. 
I have argued, in a book called Cultivating Humanity, that three 
capacities, above all, are essential to the cultivation of humanity in 
today's world, and for the health of democratic citizenship. First is 
the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one's traditions 
-- for living what, following Socrates, we may call "the examined 
life."   This means a life that accepts no belief as authoritative simply 
because it has been handed down by tradition or become familiar 
through habit, a life that questions all beliefs and accepts only those 
that survive reason's demand for consistency and for justification. 
Training this capacity requires developing the capacity to reason 
logically, to test what one reads or says for consistency of reason-
ing, correctness of fact, and accuracy of judgment.  Testing of this 
sort frequently produces challenges to tradition, as Socrates knew 
well when he defended himself against the charge of "corrupting the 
young."  But he defended his activity on the grounds that democracy 
needs citizens who can think for themselves rather than simply defer-
ring to authority, who can reason together about their choices rather 
than just trading claims and counter-claims.  Like a gadfly on the back 
of a noble but sluggish horse, he said, he was waking democracy up 
so that it could conduct its business in a more reflective and reason-
able way.   Our democracy, like ancient Athens, is prone to hasty and 
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sloppy reasoning, and to the substitution of invective for real delibera-
tion.  We need Socratic teaching to fulfill the promise of democratic 
citizenship.    Schools that help young people speak in their own voice 
and to respect the voices of others will have done a great deal to pro-
duce thoughtful and potentially creative democratic citizens, citizens 
who can understand Hecuba's suffering without imposing on it their 
own schemes of domination.
Citizens who cultivate their humanity need, further, my second ele-
ment, an ability to see themselves as not simply citizens of some 
local region or group but also, and above all, as human beings bound 
to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern: as 
"citizens of the world," as the ancient Greco-Roman tradition that 
Seneca belonged to expressed the idea. Cultivating our humanity in 
a complex interlocking world involves understanding the ways in 
which common needs and aims are differently realized in different 
circumstances.  This requires a great deal of knowledge that students 
in Europe and North America rarely got in previous eras, knowledge 
of non-Western cultures, and also of minorities within their own, of 
differences of gender, race, and sexuality.   In the years since I wrote 
the book, there has been great progress integrating the study of race 
and gender into undergraduate curricula of many kinds.  There has 
been much less progress conveying an adequate understanding of 
the reality of an interlocking world order.  Students should begin 
very early to learn the rudiments of world history, and to gain a basic 
understanding of the major world religions.  It is easier to do this if 
one begins when children are young, so that they come to see the 
world - and their own nation itself -- as complex and heterogeneous 
rather than as local and homogeneous. 
But, now, let me turn to the third part of my proposal.   Citizens can-
not think well on the basis of factual knowledge alone.  The third 
ability of the citizen, closely related to the first two, can be called the 
narrative imagination.   This means the ability to think what it might 
be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an 
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intelligent reader of that person's story, and to understand the emo-
tions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might have.  That 
is why I began this talk with Hecuba and why I have focused through-
out on the development of capacities for imaginative and emotional 
understanding, capacities that we associate with literature and the 
other arts. The cultivation of sympathy, which I take to be the central 
public task of ancient Athenian tragedy, has also been a key part of the 
best modern ideas of progressive education.  The great John Dewey 
long ago argued that the arts were modes of intelligent perception and 
experience that should play a crucial role in education, forming the 
civic imagination.  He protested against the usual sort of education, 
in which "Achievement comes to denote the sort of thing that a well-
planned machine can do better than a human being can."  Similarly, 
in India, the distinguished poet and educator Rabindranath Tagore 
wrote, concerning the role of the arts in his school at Santiniketan, 
"We may become powerful by knowledge, but we attain fullness by 
sympathy…But we find that this education of sympathy is not only 
systematically ignored in schools, but it is severely repressed."   The 
education of sympathy is being repressed once again today, as arts 
and humanities programs are increasingly being cut back in schools 
in many nations, in favor of a focus on technical and scientific educa-
tion, which is seen as the key to a nation's financial success.  
Courses in literature and the arts can cultivate sympathy in many 
ways, through engagement with many different works of literature, 
music, fine art, and dance.  But my example from Euripides suggests 
that thought needs to be given to what the student's particular blind 
spots are likely to be, and texts should be chosen in consequence. 
For all societies at all times have their particular blind spots, groups 
within their culture and also groups abroad that are especially likely 
to be dealt with ignorantly and obtusely.  Works of art can be chosen 
to promote criticism of this obtuseness, and a more adequate vision 
of the unseen.  Ralph Ellison, in a later essay about his great novel 
Invisible Man, wrote that a novel such as his could be "a raft of per-
ception, hope, and entertainment" on which American culture could 
7
"negotiate the snags and whirlpools" that stand between us and our 
democratic ideal.  His novel, of course, takes the "inner eyes" of 
the white reader as its theme and its target.  The hero is invisible to 
white society, but he tells us that this invisibility is an imaginative 
and educational failing on their part, not a biological accident on his. 
Through the imagination we are able to have a kind of insight into the 
experience of another group or person that it is very difficult to attain 
in daily life -- particularly when our world has constructed sharp 
separations between groups, and suspicions that make any encounter 
difficult. 
So we need to cultivate our students' "inner eyes," and this means 
carefully crafted courses in the arts and humanities, which bring stu-
dents into contact with issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and cross-cul-
tural experience and understanding.   This artistic instruction can and 
should be linked to the "citizen of the world" instruction, since works 
of art are frequently an invaluable way of beginning to understand the 
achievements and sufferings of a culture different from one's own. 
The arts are also crucial sources of both freedom and community. 
When people put on a play together, they have to learn to go beyond 
tradition and authority, if they are going to express themselves well. 
And the sort of community created by the arts is non-hierarchical, a 
valuable model of the responsiveness and interactivity that a good 
democracy will also foster in its political processes. When I talked 
to the late Amita Sen, who danced in Rabindranath Tagore's dance-
dramas, first in his progressive school in Santiniketan and then on the 
Kolkata stage, I see the revolutionary nature of what Tagore had done 
for young women in particular, urging them to express themselves 
freely through their bodies and to join with him in a kind of profound-
ly egalitarian play.  The scandal of this freedom, as young women of 
good family suddenly turned up on the Kolkata stage, shook conven-
tion and tradition to their foundations.  
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Finally, the arts are great sources of joy for children, and indeed for 
adults as well. Participating in plays, songs, and dances fills children 
with joy, and this joy carries over into the rest of their education. 
Amita Sen's book about Tagore as choreographer is aptly entitled, in 
English, Joy in All Work, and it shows how all the “regular” education 
in Santiniketan, the education that enabled these students to perform 
very well in standard examinations, was infused with passion and 
delight because of the way in which education was combined with 
dance and song.  Children do not like to sit still all day; but they also 
do not know automatically how to express emotion with their bodies 
in dance.  Tagore's extremely expressive, but also extremely disci-
plined dance regime was an essential source of creativity, thought, 
and freedom for all pupils, but particularly, perhaps, for women, 
whose bodies had been taught to be shame-ridden and inexpressive. 
This is her general description of what Tagore was trying to convey 
for and with children through dance:
His dance was a dance of emotion.  The playful clouds 
in the sky, the shivering of the wind in the leaves, light 
glistening on the grass, moonlight flooding the earth, the 
blossoming and fading of flowers, the murmur of dry 
leaves - the pulsing of joy in a man's heart, or the pangs 
of sorrow, are all expressed in this expressive dance's 
movements and expressions.i 
We should bear in mind that we hear the voice of an older woman 
recalling her childhood experience.  How extraordinary that the emo-
tions and the poetry of the child live on so vigorously in the woman, 
and what a tribute this is to the capacity of this sort of education for 
a kind of enlivening of the imagination that continues on in one's life 
when all specific learned facts are forgotten.   Furthermore, Amita Sen 
makes it perfectly clear that the dance experience was itself highly 
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i. Amita Sen, Joy in All Work, 35
disciplined and a fine source of the understanding of discipline for 
children, and at the same time closely interwoven with learning of 
more traditional types, not just a kind of distracting fun and games.
There is a further point to be made about what the arts do for the spec-
tator.   As Tagore knew, and as radical artists have often emphasized, 
the arts, by generating pleasure in connection with acts of subversion 
and cultural criticism, produce an endurable and even attractive dia-
logue with the prejudices of the past, rather than one fraught with fear 
and defensiveness.   That is what Ellison meant by calling Invisible 
Man  “a raft of perception, hope, and entertainment” that could help 
the American democracy “negotiate the snags and whirlpools” that 
stand between it and “the democratic idea.”  Entertainment is crucial 
to the ability of the arts to offer perception and hope.  It's not just the 
experience of the performer, then, that is so important for democracy, 
it's the way in which performance offers a venue for exploring dif-
ficult issues without crippling anxiety.  
How are the abilities of citizenship doing in the world today?  Very 
poorly, I fear. Education of the type I recommend is doing quite well 
in the place where I first studied it, namely the liberal arts portion of 
U. S. college and university curricula.  Indeed, it is this part of the 
curriculum, in institutions such as my own, that particularly attracts 
philanthropic support, as rich people remember with pleasure the time 
when they read books that they loved, and pursued issues open-end-
edly.  
Outside the U. S., many nations whose university curricula do not 
include a liberal arts component are now striving to build one, since 
they acknowledge its importance in crafting a public response to the 
problems of pluralism, fear, and suspicion their societies face. I've 
been involved in such discussions  in the Netherlands, in Sweden, in 
India, in Germany, in Italy, in India and Bangladesh.  Whether reform 
in this direction will occur, however, is hard to say: for liberal educa-
tion has high financial and pedagogical costs.  Teaching of the sort I 
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recommend needs small classes, or at least sections, where students 
get copious feedback on frequent writing assignments.  European 
professors are not used to this idea, and would at present be horrible 
at it if they did try to do it, since they are not trained as teachers in the 
way that U. S. graduate students are, and come to expect that holding 
a chair means not having to grade undergraduate writing assignments. 
Even when faculty are keen on the liberal arts model, bureaucrats 
are unwilling to believe that it is necessary to support the number 
of faculty positions required to make it really work.  Thus, at the 
University of Oslo a compulsory ethics course has been introduced 
for all first-year students, but it is taught as a lecture course with 500 
people, and a multiple-choice examination at the end.  This is worse 
than useless, since it gives students the illusion that they have actually 
had some philosophical education, when they have had only a gesture 
towards such an education.  In Sweden, at the new urban university 
Sodertorn's Hogskola, a large proportion of whose students are immi-
grants, the faculty and the Vice-Chancellor badly want a liberal arts 
curriculum based on the idea of preparation for democratic citizen-
ship.  They have sent young faculty to U. S. liberal arts colleges to 
study and practice this type of small-classroom teaching, and they 
have constructed an exciting course on democracy.  As yet, however, 
they do not have enough manpower to hold the class in small sec-
tions with lots of group discussion and copious writing assignments, 
something that is crucial if the class is to succeeed.   Only in small 
idiosyncratic institutions, such as the Institute for Humanist Studies 
in Utrecht, is the liberal arts idea a reality in Europe.  
Another problem that European universities have is that new disci-
plines of particular importance for good democratic citizenship have 
no secure place in the structure of undergraduate education.  Women's 
Studies, the study of race and ethnicity, Judaic studies, Islamic studies 
- all these are likely to be marginalized, catering only to the student 
who already knows a lot about the area and who wants to focus on 
it.  In the liberal arts system, by contrast, such new disciplines can 
provide courses that all undergraduates are required to take, and can 
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also enrich the required liberal arts offerings in other disciplines, such 
as literature and history.  Where there are no such requirements, the 
new disciplines remain marginal.
So the universities of the world have great merits, but also great prob-
lems.  By contrast, the abilities of citizenship are doing very poorly, 
in every nation, in the most crucial years of childrens' lives, the years 
known as K through 12.  Here the demands of the global market have 
made everyone focus on scientific and technical proficiency as the 
key abilities, and the humanities and the arts are increasingly per-
ceived as useless frills, which we can prune away to make sure our 
nation (whether it be India or the U. S.) remains competitive.  To the 
extent that they are the focus of national discussion, they are recast as 
technical abilities themselves, to be tested by quantitative multiple-
choice examinations, and the imaginative and critical abilities that lie 
at their core are typically left aside.  At one time, Dewey's emphasis 
on learning by doing and on the arts would have been second nature 
in any American elementary school.  Now it is under threat even at the 
Dewey Laboratory School.  National testing has already made things 
worse in the U. S. , as national testing usually does: for at least my 
first and third ability are not testable by quantitative multiple choice 
exams, and the second is very poorly tested in such ways.  (Moreover, 
nobody bothers to try to test it even in that way.)   Whether a nation 
is aspiring to a greater share of the market, like India, or struggling 
to protect jobs, like the U. S., the imagination and the critical facul-
ties look like useless paraphernalia, and people even have increasing 
contempt for them.   
Thus the humanities are turned into rapid exercises in rote learning, 
packaged, often, in state-approved textbooks, and the whole political 
debate comes to be focused on the content of these textbooks, rather 
than on the all-important issue of pedagogy.  At this point I cannot 
resist introducing the great educator Rabindranath Tagore's short 
story, called "The Parrot's Training," which provides a very good 
picture of education in our time, as in his.   (Tagore briefly went to 
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several schools, but he detested the school experience and left as soon 
as he could.)
A certain Raja had a bird whom he loved.  He wanted to educate it, 
because he thought ignorance was a bad thing.  His pundits convinced 
him that the bird must go to school.   The first thing that had to be 
done was to give the bird a suitable edifice for his schooling: so they 
build a magnificent golden cage.  The next thing was to get good 
textbooks.  The pundits said, “Textbooks can never be too many for 
our purpose.”  Scribes worked day and night to produce the requisite 
manuscripts.  Then, teachers were employed.  Somehow or other they 
got quite a lot of money for themselves and built themselves good 
houses.  When the Raja visited the school, the teachers showed him 
the methods used to instruct the parrot.  “The method was so stupen-
dous that the bird looked ridiculously unimportant in comparison. 
The Raja was satisfied that there was no flaw in the arrangements. 
As for any complaint from the bird itself, that simply could not be 
expected.  Its throat was so completely choked with the leaves from 
the books that it could neither whistle nor whisper.”  
The lessons continued.  One day, the bird died.  Nobody had the least 
idea how long ago this had happened.  The Rajah's nephews, who had 
been in charge of the education ministry, reported to the Raja: “'Sire, 
the bird's education has been completed.'  
'Does it hop?' the Raja enquired.
'Never!' said the nephews.
'Does it fly?'
'No.'
'Bring me the bird,' said the Raja.
The bird was brought to him, guarded by the kotwal and the 
sepoys and the sowars.  The Raja poked its body with his fin-
ger.  Only its inner stuffing of book-leaves rustled.
13
Outside the window, the murmur of the spring breeze amongst 
the newly budded asoka leaves made the April morning wist-
ful.ii 
This wonderful story hardly needs commentary.   Its crucial point is 
that educationists tend to enjoy talking about themselves and their 
own activity, and to focus too little on the small tender children 
whose eagerness and curiosity should be the core of the educational 
endeavor.  Tagore thought that children were usually more alive than 
adults, because less weighted down by habit.  The task of education 
was to avoid killing off that curiosity, and then to build outward from 
it, in a spirit of respect for the child's freedom and individuality rather 
than one of hierarchical imposition of information.   
I do not agree with absolutely everything in Tagore's educational 
ideal.  For example, I am less anti-memorization than Tagore was. 
Memorization of fact can play a valuable and even a necessary role 
in giving pupils command over their own relationship to history and 
political argument.   That's one reason why good textbooks are impor-
tant, something that Tagore would have disputed.  But about the large 
point I am utterly in agreement: education must begin with the mind 
of the child, and it must have the goal of increasing that mind's free-
dom in its social environment, rather than killing it off.    (I note that 
good nongovernmental organizations that conduct literacy programs 
for women and girls in India, a large part of what I have studied, do 
everything Tagore would have wanted and everything that my three-
part structure recommends.  They do not fall victim to rote learning, 
because they know that their students won't stay around unless edu-
cation is enlivening, and they use the arts and literature very produc-
tively to stimulate criticism of imprisoning traditions.  
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ii. From V. Bhatia, ed., Rabindranath Tagore: Pioneer in Education 
(New Delhi: Sahitya Chayan, 1994
But now to return to Europe: Only if these three abilities are culti-
vated at all levels, I believe, will the democracies of Europe be able 
to weather the crisis of fear and suspicion that is currently besetting 
them.  Curricula need to be radically rethought with these func-
tions in mind.  Particularly at the university level, such changes will 
involve very great upheaval.  The price of not facing the difficulty of 
change, however, will be an impoverished dialogue between groups 
and individuals, and dialogue is absolutely crucial to the future of the 
European democracies.  
Let me now return to the example from Greek tragedy with which I 
began, drawing together these ruminations about democratic educa-
tion with my problems about compassion and the tragic imagination. 
As Hecuba's example shows, democracies have great rational and 
imaginative powers.  They also are prone to some serious flaws in 
reasoning, to parochialism, haste, sloppiness, selfishness.  Education 
based mainly on profitability in the global market magnifies these 
deficiencies, producing a greedy obtuseness that threatens the very 
life of democracy itself.  We need to listen, once again, to the ideas of 
Socrates and Seneca, and to the related modern ideas of Dewey and 
Tagore, favoring an education that cultivates the critical capacities, 
that fosters a complex understanding of the world and its peoples, 
and that educates and refines the capacity for sympathy - in short, an 
education that cultivates human beings and their humanity, rather than 
producing generations of useful machines.  If we do not insist on the 
crucial importance of the humanities and the arts, they will drop away, 
because they don't make money.  They only do what is much more 
precious than that, make a world that is worth living in, and democra-
cies that are able to overcome fear and suspicion and to generate vital 
spaces for sympathetic and reasoned debate.  
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